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 Abstract : The objective of this paper is to discuss issues of law enforcement in Malaysian Securities Markets.  
This survey was conducted among 107 principal and representative licensees registered with the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia. They consist of licensed dealers, investment advisers and fund managers. The majority 
of the respondents were capital markets and services representative licensees (CMSRL), while only 17 
respondents were capital markets and services licensees. On a scale of one to five, respondents were found to be 
generally satisfied with the roles and responsibilities of enforcement bodies i.e. Securities Commission and 
Bursa Malaysia (mean of satisfaction = 3.660 to 3.952).  The study shows that there is a positive relationship 
between the views and attitudes of respondents towards the implementation of the legal philosophy by the 
enforcement bodies (r= .524, r= .480).  As the main enforcement agencies, Securities Commission and Bursa 
Malaysia should further enhance efforts to monitor and enforce the law of capital markets. In conclusion, this 
paper provides useful information in relation to factors contributing to non compliance of participants of the 
capital markets.  The enforcement bodies can implement measures on how to curb the unethical behaviour by 
carrying out ethics training and introducing new rules and regulations for the industry.  
Keywords - enforcement of law, investor protection, non-compliance, securities law, securities commission 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Capital and services markets provide a useful means to mobilize capital and harness economic interests 
in an efficient manner to drive innovation and growth. Toward this end, Malaysia has implemented various 
measures to make the capital markets more attractive and competitive in the form of Disclosure Based 
Regulations (DBR) through the Malaysian Capital Markets Master Plan 2000 – 2010. Recently, in 2011, the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia launched the second phase of the plan which focuses more on the regulatory 
challenges, growth, international standards and governance. In 2010, the Malaysian capital markets generated 
substantial income for the country. The equity market generated market RM1,275 billion, the bond market 
RM759 billion, the Islamic Capital Markets RM1,050 billion, the investment management RM377 billion, and 
the derivatives market RM43 billion (Securities Commission, 2011) [1]. The huge income generated by this 
industry is because of the capital and services market in Malaysia is well-regulated and this is recognized by the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO, 2011) [2]. Further, Malaysia is the signatory to 
cross-border enforcement arrangements and known for high standards of regulation internationally. The MMOU 
has enhanced the SC's supervision and enforcement capabilities in dealing with cross-border market abuse, 
particularly in the area of financial fraud and insider trading, and has raised the level of overall investor 
protection in Malaysian market (Neetasha Rauf, 2012) [3].  The main regulator for the industry is the Malaysian 
Securities Commission which has a legal power under the Securities Commission Act 1993, whereas, the Bursa 
Malaysia is the main registered stock exchange in Malaysia and acting as a self regulator body for its members 
and recognized and given powers under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007.  They play important roles 
to enhance the securities markets and services in Malaysia. The Malaysian securities markets regulation has a 
comprehensive legal framework. But looking at the statistic of securities crimes in Malaysia, it shows increasing 
numbers in cases of securities crimes (Securities Commission, 2011) [4].  For example between 2004 and 2006, 
2006 there were nine cases involving misconduct in securities transactions. The study by Asmah, Nurli, and 
Rohana (2002) [5] found that among the categories listed company involved in the non-compliance with the 
Listing Requirements of the KLSE (now known as Bursa Malaysia) is the manufacturing industry (24%), 
construction (18.7%), and securities market industry (14.7%). Other industries, however, showed a relatively 
low percentage of non-compliance. Therefore, it is paramount important to discuss about the findings of the 
study in relation to law enforcement in Malaysian Securities Markets.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Malaysia has fully observed one of the 32 benchmarks (on accounting standards) and has largely 
observed nearly all of the benchmarks under the six categories of methodology (81% of 32 benchmarks) [6].  
Since then, Malaysia continued to close the gaps on the remaining shortcomings, the most significant being 
amending the Companies Act 1965 (CA) to address gaps in related-party transactions, penalties for 
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contravention by directors, private enforcement capacity of investors and disclosure; amending the listing 
requirements for stricter disclosures by listed companies; implementing measures to expand the role of the 
audit committee in line with international best practices; the Capital Market & Services Act 2007 (CMSA) 
enhancing the effectiveness of regulatory oversight of the SC by empowering it to institute civil proceedings; 
and transforming GLCs into high-performing entities and upgrading of GLC boards 
. 
1.  Enforcement Bodies: Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
The Securities Commission established on 1 March 1993 under the Securities Commission Act 1993.   
The Commission is a self-funding statutory body with investigative and enforcement powers. It reports to the 
Minister of Finance and its accounts are tabled in Parliament annually. The SC's many regulatory functions 
include supervising exchanges, clearing houses and central depositories; registering authority for prospectuses 
of corporations other than unlisted recreational clubs; approving authority for corporate bond issues; regulating 
all matters relating to securities and futures contracts; regulating the take-over and mergers of companies 
;regulating all matters relating to unit trust schemes; licensing and supervising all licensed persons; encouraging 
self-regulation; and ensuring proper conduct of market institutions and licensed persons.  
Improving transparency and benchmarking against best international practices have been key factor in 
transforming the Malaysian capital market as an efficient source for raising longer-term funds to finance 
economic activity. Reflecting the importance accorded to meeting international standards, 43 of the 152 
recommendations in the Capital Market Master plan that were released in 2002 were related to improving 
transparency and promoting higher standards of disclosures. To date, 37 of these 43 recommendations has been 
implemented (2010, Securities Commission) [7]. Further, the Securities Commission, as the competent 
regulatory authority for oversight of the capital market, has voluntarily undertaken independent assessments 
under the various standards set by the IMF/World Bank, and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). The SC has also supported the move to comply with international best practices on 
accounting-related matters.  
  In relation to the implementation of Code of Corporate Governance, Malaysia voluntarily agreed to be 
assessed under the Corporate Governance Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (CG ROSC) by 
the World Bank in 2005, based on a methodology that is benchmarked against the internationally accepted 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Malaysia has published the CG ROSC that was completed in 2005.  
  Malaysia has fully observed one of the 32 benchmarks (on accounting standards) and has largely 
observed nearly all of the benchmarks under the six categories of methodology (81% of 32 benchmarks). Since 
then, Malaysia continued to close the gaps on the remaining shortcomings, the most significant being amending 
the Companies Act 1965 (CA) [8] to address gaps in related-party transactions, penalties for contravention by 
directors, private enforcement capacity of investors and disclosure; amending the listing requirements for 
stricter disclosures by listed companies; implementing measures to expand the role of the audit committee in 
line with international best practices; the Capital Market & Services Act 2007 (CMSA) enhancing the 
effectiveness of regulatory oversight of the SC by empowering it to institute civil proceedings; and 
transforming GLCs into high-performing entities and upgrading of GLC boards. In addition, the SC is also 
working closely with the respective Malaysian accounting boards to integrate accounting principles, with a 
commitment on full convergence with international accounting standards by 2012.  
As for Bursa Malaysia, in striving to build a market of quality and integrity, it is guided by regulatory 
principles to achieve goals in the aspect of  (a) investor protection to remain intact, (b) high standards of 
business conduct by listed issuers and brokers and (c) efficient and effective (Bursa Malaysia, 2012) [9]. 
 
2.  Law, Principles, Rules and Policy 
The Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 (CMSA 2007) [10] states offences of securities crimes 
includes false trading, market rigging, market manipulation, fraudulent and misleading trading, dissemination of 
false trading and  insider trading. Implementation of dual sanction, criminal and civil actions in combating 
securities crimes is seen as an effective strategy.  These provisions are stated in the CMSA 2007 in Part V, 
Division 1, section 175 to 201.    
According to the Bursa Malaysia in managing conflicts of interests with public interest, public interest and in 
particular the need for investor protection should prevail and the measures are separation of the regulatory 
functions from the commercial functions to ensure that these functions operate independently; and that business 
units within Bursa Malaysia are not in a position to influence any supervisory or regulatory decisions made by 
regulation.(Bursa Malaysia, 2012) [11].   
As for Bursa Malaysia in regulating market misconduct, it has the Business Rules of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad (Market Misconduct) [12] where the key trading rules that market surveillance focuses on the following 
issues: (a) Rule 401.1(2) where participating Organisations (POs), Heads of Dealing (HD) and Dealer's 
Representative (DR) shall refrain themselves from engaging in, or be a party to, any unethical practices that may 
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damage the confidence of investors and hamper the sound development of the stock market, (b) Rule 
401.1(3)(a) and (b)  where POs, HD and DR shall avoid, and shall not participate in any operation by others 
which might have the same result, any act or practice which might lead to a false or misleading appearance of 
active trading in any securities on the stock market of the Exchange or a false or misleading appearance with 
respect to the market for, or the price of, any such securities; or directly or indirectly be tantamount to stock 
market manipulations, (c) Rule 404.1(4) where a PO shall not allow any form of irregular and/or unhealthy 
practice to exist or prevail in its daily and professional business conduct, (d)Rule 404.1(7)(c)  where every PO 
shall at all times maintain a proper supervisory programme and a system of internal controls which must take 
into account among others, the PO's operations and proper conduct of its business and (e) Rule 404.3(1)(a) and 
(c) where every PO and every DR shall at all times observe professional standard of integrity and fair dealing 
and conduct their business in a manner which contributes to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market. 
Further, market surveillance by the Bursa Malaysia is to ensure the market operates in a fair and orderly manner 
so as to promote efficient price discovery and investor protection.  This is achieved through the conduct of 
dynamic and timely regulatory measures, the undertaking of real-time and post-trade monitoring and analysis of 
both equities and derivatives trading activities (Bursa Malaysia, 2012) [13]. The surveillance system is able to 
detect a wide range of possible market misconduct situations on real-time basis.  The Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements of Public Listed Companies (PLCs) is also one of legal document which regulates PLC in its 
business activities [14].  
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To achieve the above objective, a survey was conducted among principal licensees registered with the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia. They consist of licensed dealers, investment advisers and fund managers. 
According to the official list issued by the Securities Commission, as at December 31, 2007, there were 37 
licensed dealers(company), investment advisers (80 companies and 16 individuals), investment advisors 
(financial planner), (27 companies,and,14 individuals), and 80 fund managers (companies). For company 
licensee dealers, questionnaires were submitted to the Company Secretary and Compliance Officer. But for 
other licensees of a company status (e.g. investment advisors), questionnaires were given to the Company 
Secretary. License holders of an individual status, the questionnaires were personally handed to them.  
Based on the distribution of questionnaires to the respondents, a total of 107 respondents had given 
their responses. Seventeen of the respondents are the Capital Markets and Services licensee while the remaining 
90 respondents are the Capital Markets and Services Representative licensee (CMSRL). The respondents were 
asked to indicate their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1‟ 
“Strongly dissatisfied” to 5‟ “Strongly satisfied”, on a number of items on the performance of the 
implementation of capital market legal philosophy and the characteristics of public disclosure policy of 
Malaysian securities markets. With respect to legal philosophy, respondents were asked to indicate to what 
extent they were satisfied or not satisfied that the legal philosophy of capital market is able to respond to any 
changes in the financial field at different times and in appropriate ways, to ensure that capital markets continue 
to operate fairly and efficiently, and to assist economic development and growth, financial and business interests 
in the future, to name a few.  
On the other hand, with respect to characteristics of public disclosure in Malaysia, respondents were 
asked to indicate whether they are satisfied or not satisfied that the public disclosure in Malaysia requires 
companies to make a public announcement of material information (e.g. income of the company, the Board of 
Directors), requires that the information disclosed in the prospectus the company must be simple and adequate 
for public knowledge, and enables and assists the public or potential investors to make the right choice and good 
value for their investment. The items of the instrument were assembled based on previous research and relevant 
Malaysian statutes, regulations and rules. 
  
IV. RESULTS 
The discussion on this part will highlight results [15] of the following items; (i) license holders views 
on roles and responsibilities of enforcement bodies, (ii) policy and business rules of Bursa Malaysia and (iii) the 
relationship between the view and attitude of the respondent on the effective implementation of legal philosophy 
Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia and (iv) discussion on selected cases where the SC had successfully 
brought these case to justice. 
 
1.  License Holders views on Roles and Responsibilities of Enforcement Bodies 
Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) plays an important roles and in enforcement 
of securities law. Table 1 and 2 below shows the effectiveness of both bodies in carrying out their functions and 
responsibilities in the securities industry in the country.  The findings show that respondents are generally 
satisfied with the effectiveness of the functions and responsibilities carried out by the two agencies.  Table 1 
describe that respondents are satisfied with the role played by the Securities Commission of Malaysia in terms 
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of ensuring that the provisions of securities laws are complied with (mean = 3.915), monitoring and supervising 
the activities of any exchange, clearing and depository (min = 3.906), and supervising all licensed holders under 
securities laws (mean = 3.952). 
Table 1: Frequency (%) Mean values for the level and effectiveness of the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia (SSM) in the Implementation Roles and Responsibilities 
From Table 2 below, the study found that respondents are generally satisfied with Bursa Malaysia's role in 
carrying out their duties and responsibilities as a self-regulator.  This is in terms of protecting the public interest 
by providing protection to investors' needs (mean = 3.869), and take appropriate action as provided in the Rules 
No. Item  NN SD D M S SS Mean 
1. Advise the Minister on all 
matters concerning 
securities and futures 
industry. 
107 - 6.5 29.0 44.9 19.6 3.775 
2. To regulate all matters 
relating to securities and 
futures contracts. 
107 - 5.6 22.4 51.4 20.6 3.869 
3. To ensure that the 
provisions of securities laws 
are complied with. 
107 - 7.5 18.7 48.6 25.2 3.915 
4. Regulate the acquisition and 
amalgamation of 
companies. 
107 - 6.5 22.4 54.2 16.8 3.813 
5. To regulate all matters 




107 - 2.8 33.6 47.7 15.9 3.766 
6. Monitor and supervise the 
activities of any exchange, 
clearing house and central 
depository. 
107 .9 3.7 19.6 55.1 20.6 3.906 
7. Promote and encourage 
good behavior among 
members of the exchange, 
clearing, depository and all 
licensed persons. 
106 1.9 7.5 31.8 43.0 15.9 3.635 
8. Consider and make 
recommendations for law 
reform in relation to 
securities and futures 
contracts. 
106 2.8 12.1 18.7 42.1 24.3 3.729 
9. Encourage and promote the 
development of securities 
markets and futures 
contracts in Malaysia, 
including research and 
training related to it. 
 
106 .9 6.6 33.0 44.3 15.1 3.660 
10. Licensing and supervising 
all licensed persons under 
the securities laws. 
 
10Dictionary 
Bottom of Form 
 
106 .9 6.6 17.9 45.3 29.2 3.952 
11. Develop and maintain the 
integrity of all licensed 
persons  
106 - 11.3 17.0 53.8 17.9 3.783 
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of Bursa Malaysia  for the purpose of monitoring or ensuring compliance (mean = 3.841).  The respondents also 
satisfied with the role of Bursa Malaysia in ensuring if any interest required to be protected by any law relating 
to conflict with the interests of the corporation as aforesaid, then the public interest should prevail (mean = 
3.719). 
Table 2: Frequency (%) Mean values for the level and effectiveness of the Bursa Malaysia (BM) in the 
Implementation Roles and Responsibilities as a Self-regulator 
No. Item N SD  D M S SS Mean 
1. Protecting the public interest by 
providing protection to investors' 
needs. 
107 - 4.7 19.6 59.8 15.9 3.869 
2. Ensure that if any interest 
required to be protected by any 
law relating to conflict with the 
interests of the corporation as 
aforesaid, then the public interest 
should prevail. 
107 .9 7.5 24.3 53.3 14.0 3.719 
3. Take appropriate action as 
provided in the Rules of Bursa 
Malaysia for the purpose of 
monitoring or ensuring 
 compliance. 
 
107 - 7.5 19.6 54.2 18.7 3.841 
2.  Policy and Business Rules of Bursa Malaysia 
Respondents were also asked about the extent to which policies and regulations of Bursa Malaysia 
(BM) and comprehensive enough. Table 3 shows the findings of the study. Generally, respondents felt that the 
policies and regulations of Bursa Malaysia in terms of public dissemination of the policy (mean = 3.476), 
immediate disclosure of material information (mean = 3654), and periodic disclosure (mean = 3.3523) is 
sufficient and comprehensive. 
Table 3: Frequency (%) and Mean Value of Any perception on the How the Policy and Rules of Bursa 
Malaysia Adequate and Comprehensive 
No. Item N SD D Uncertain A SA Mean 
1. Corporate disclosure 
policies are generally in the 
Listing Requirements of 
Public Listed Companies is 
sufficient and 
comprehensive. 
107 - 8.4 30.8 54.2 6.5 3.588 
2. Immediate disclosure of 
policy information is 
sufficient and 
comprehensive material. 
107 - 9.3 23.4 59.8 7.5 3.654 
3. Public dissemination of the 




107 .9 15.9 22.4 56.1 4.7 3.476 
4. Policy information, 
confirmation and denial of 
rumors or reports are 
adequate and 
comprehensive. 
107 - 18.7 36.4 36.4 8.4 3.345 
5. Policy information, 
confirmation and denial of 
rumors or reports are 
adequate and 
107 .9 10.3 33.6 48.6 6.5 3.495 
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comprehensive. 
6. Policy disclosure in 
promotional activities to 
excess is sufficient and 
comprehensive. 
107 - 13.1 43.0 36.4 7.5 3.382 
7. Policy on insider trading is 
sufficient and 
comprehensive. 
107 1.9 13.1 34.6 44.9 5.6 3.392 
8. Regulations on disclosure 
are adequate and 
comprehensive periodic 
107 - 9.3 35.5 48.6 6.5 3.523 
9. Regulations pertaining to 
the early preparation for 
the announcement to the 
public is sufficient and 
comprehensive. 
 
107 - 9.3 27.1 57.0 6.5 3.607 
 
3. The relationship between the view and attitude of the Respondent on the Effective Implementation of 
Legal Philosophy Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
In addition to descriptive analysis made on data collected, this study also conducted a correlation 
analysis of the study variables.  The correlation matrix is shown in Table 4 below. Table 4 below shows that 
there is a positive relationship between the views and attitudes of respondents in relation to the implementation 
of the legal philosophy of the effectiveness of the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia's performance of 
its functions and responsibilities as law enforcement agencies (r = .524, r = 480). In other words, the SC and 
Bursa Malaysia is seen to play their role effectively in accordance with the legal philosophy of the capital 
market in Malaysia. 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Philosophy (1) - .427** .524** .480** .311** .223* .173 .207* .107 
Disclosure (2)  - .360** .356** .126 .276* .095 .135 .328** 
SSM (3)   - .644** .571** .277* .346** .234* .134 
BM (4)    - .457** .313** .143 .189 .105 
BM Policy(5)     - .151 .253* .177 .094 
Crimes (6)      - .423** .387** .346** 
Punishment (7)       - .091 .290* 
Civil Sanction(8)        - .220* 
Non compliance (9)         - 
4.  Enforcement of law 
The success of Securities Commission in criminal prosecution in 2012, can be referred to the case 
Ashari Rahmat (Securities Commission, 2012) [16] where Ashari an operating Ashari, an operating officer of 
MIH, was charged in 2000 for engaging in an act which operated as a deceit on UPA Corporation Berhad's IPO 
exercise by switching successful applications with those not put through the balloting process. His conviction 
was confirmed and the fine sentence of RM1 million was ordered to be paid. The High Court also allowed a stay 
of the jail sentence pending appeal to the Court of Appeal upon payment of bail in the sum of RM500,000.  
In 2011, in the case of Chan Kok Suan (Securities Commission, 2011) [17] , the Group Managing 
Director of Granasia Corporation Bhd, ("GCB"), was charged for causing to be submitted to SC false 
information, namely the revenue and profit after tax of GCB for the year ended 31 Dec 2002. This information 
was submitted in connection with GCB's listing proposal on the Main Board of the Exchange. The High Court 
Judge maintained the RM500,000.00 fine but increased the default of imprisonment from 10 months to 2 years. 
The prosecution has filed an appeal against the sentence to the Court of Appeal. In another case Mok Chin Fan, 
Jimmy Tok Soon Guan & Cheong Kok Yai (Directors of Inix Technologies Holding Bhd) were charged with 
offences under s.122B(b)(bb) of the Securities Industry Act (SIA) for knowingly authorising the furnishing of 
false statements to Bursa in relation to Inix's 4 quarterly reports for FYE 31 July 2006; i.e. 31 Oct 2005, 31 Jan 
2006, 30 April 2006 & 31 July 2006. In addition they were charged under s.55(1)(a) of the Securities 
Commission Act (SCA) for causing the issuance of INIX Prospectus, which contained information that is false. 
Normah bt Sapar (Senior Account Executive of Inix) was charged with abetting Jimmy Tok in committing all 
the offences set out above.  On 29 September 2011, Mok Chin Fan (Mok), Cheong Kok Yai (Cheong) and 
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Normah binti Sapar (Normah) pleaded guilty to all the offences they were charged with. Jimmy Tok Soon Guan 
pleaded guilty to all the offences he was charged with on 13 October 2011. Mok and Cheong were each fined 
RM125,000 (in default 1 year imprisonment) for the offence under s.55 of the SCA and fined RM50,000 (in 
default 6 months imprisonment) for each of the four offences under s.122B of the SIA bringing the total fine 
imposed on Mok and Cheong to RM325,000. Normah was fined RM150,000 (in default 1 year imprisonment) 
for the offence under s.55  of the SCA and fined  RM50,000 (in default 6 months imprisonment) for each of the 
four offences under s.122B of the SIA bringing the total fine imposed on Normah to RM350,000. Jimmy the 
CEO and Executive Director of INIX, was fined RM400,000  (in default 2 year imprisonment) for the offence 
under s.55 of the SCA. For the 4 offences under s.122B of the SIA, he was fined RM200,000 (in default 18 
months imprisonment) for the first and second charges respectively and RM150,000 (in default 12 months 
imprisonment) for the third and fourth charge respectively bringing the total fine imposed on Jimmy to RM1.1 
million. 
In relation to civil actions and regulatory settlements the SC entered into a settlement with Lim Chin 
Chin (Securities Commission, 2012) [18]  in the sum of RM232,320 when she agreed without admission or 
denial of liability to settle a claim that the SC was proposing to institute against her for insider trading in the 
shares of Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad ('Sin Chew') between 29 January 2007 and 30 January 2007, 
contrary to Section 89E(3)(a) of the Securities Industry Act 1983.  The settlement was reached following a 
letter of demand sent by the SC pursuant to its civil enforcement powers under the securities laws, where the 
sum Lim Chin Chin was required to disgorge was equivalent to three times the gains made by Ong Sew Teng 
and Chong Hiong Lim in connection with their trades in Sin Chew shares. 
Sanctions were imposed for various breaches of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements against listed issuers 
and their directors as shown in the table below. For 2008, the total number of sanctions issued was 160 and 
included reprimand and fines amounting to RM1,283,400.  
Table 5:  Enforcement by Bursa Malaysia 
Sanctions Imposed Listed Issuers Directors Total 
Public Reprimand and Fine 1 53 54 
Public Reprimand 49 17 66 
Private Reprimand 21 19 40 
Total Sanctions 71 89 160 
Total Fines Imposed (RM) 5,000 1,278,400 1,283,400 
(Source: Bursa Malaysia, 2012) 
Enforcement actions were also instituted against market participants, their dealer representatives and 
agents for violation of Bursa Malaysia Rules. In 2008, a total of 127 enforcement actions were initiated and 
completed, with priority given to market offences. These actions encompass caution, reprimand, fines and 
suspension as presented in the table below and resulted in imposition of fines amounting to RM610,000. In 
order to enhance market awareness, the more severe breaches will be imposed public sanctions. 
Table 6:  Enforcement Actions by Bursa Malaysia 
















Striking off - - - - 1 1 
Suspension - - - - 1 1 
Reprimand & 
Fine 
5 - 4 - - 9 
Fine 24 3 2 - 14 43 
Reprimand 20 9 1 5 12 47 
Caution 17 3 4 - 2 26 
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Total 
Sanctions 




363,900 2,300 70,000 - 173,800 610,000 
 
(Source: Bursa Malaysia, 2012) 
V. CONCLUSION 
The overall findings of the study shows that respondents generally satisfied with the roles and 
responsibilities of enforcement bodies i.e. Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia (mean of satisfaction = 
3.660 to 3.952).  Further, the study also shows that there is a positive relationship between the views and 
attitudes of respondents towards the implementation of the legal philosophy by the enforcement bodies (r= .524, 
r= .480).  Even though the result is positive but as the main enforcement agencies, Securities Commission and 
Bursa Malaysia should further enhance efforts to monitor and enforce the law of capital markets.  It is also 
proposed that courts should also play its role in imposing fines on criminals based on the amount of losses 
suffered by investors, severity and effects of crimes on markets stability. The courts should impose the 
maximum penalty rather than a moderate amount which is not justified the harm done to the markets and 
investors as a whole. More importantly, ethics training should be imposed to license holders by the Securities 
Commission. In conclusion, this paper provides useful information in relation to enforcement of law in 
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